

# STUDY GUIDE

EXCOMM

15-17  
MAY   
BAALMUN'26

# ExCOMM

**LEAKED DOCUMENT: REPORT OF THE UNDER-  
SECRETARIES GENERAL REGARDING THE EXCOMM,  
UPDATE 2.0**

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BAALMUN'26

ExComm

## **Introduction**

This report is compiled to transmit the opinions on the current layout of the -REDACTED- and recommendations from -REDACTED-. Concisely, the decision-making involved in giving this committee its current state is flawed, and the committee is in dire need of revitalization, even by unconventional methods.

But first, we must ask ourselves and understand the foundation of what we are trying to achieve with this committee. The main objective of a crisis committee is to be a fast-paced alternative to the procedural committees, and -REDACTED- must execute this while following a form of respect to the timeline it is reacting. Moreover, our agenda of choice raises its own set of mechanics, which will require utmost attention at times to nail realism.

### **Factors in Play**

#### **Fast pace**

As mentioned above, a crisis committee must operate at greater speed than a procedural committee. We must be capable of emulating weeks, months, or years within less than three days. This requires uncontestable coordination between the administrative factors to present proper and timely updates to the timeline.

#### **Unicameral Structure**

The decision to simulate the -REDACTED- with a unicameral, instead of the community-norm joint, (bicameral, with sub-committees allotted for the US and the USSR) structure is unique, if not dubious. However, the presented layout should be treated as an

opportunity instead of an obstacle. Yet, this also means only one side of the event could be emulated.

### **Decision-making Process**

We have also come to the same conclusion that a well-crafted decision-making process must be established to offer a better simulation and realistic flow of debate. Incorporating a basic system, where the committee is nothing but writing confidential assassination directives to eliminate the opposite side, would only ensure boredom. Instead, the decision-making process must be a combination of the emulated establishment and a modified ROP compatible with the edge cases of the committee.

### **Other Historical Mechanics**

We believe two main mechanics dictated the -REDACTED- on both sides: the delay in communications during heated incidents and the importance of sustaining diplomacy to prevent -REDACTED-. Along with our other suggestions, these two mechanics shall be thoroughly reminded to the delegates.

### **Opinions on the Structure of the Committee**

This unseen arrangement of the agenda to unicameral structure could prove lacking results if the committee were to be treated ordinarily to only combat against an imaginary and played by an understaffed Crisis Team, enemy. Furthermore, any additional motions in sponsorship of simulating both (or all, with the inclusion of -REDACTED-) sides within a single room, would produce the same casted results described above. Bonus destructiveness is guaranteed if a non-modified version of the -REDACTED- for crises is adopted for the committee. This

course of action, if unchanged, is bound to have the participants leave with one question in their minds: -REDACTED-

### **Opinions on the Programme of Work and the Agenda**

On the remarks of the -REDACTED-

On the execution of the agenda<sup>1</sup>, we have reached a unanimous agreement with each other that such a way would completely go against the agenda and any structure of the committee that it may evolve into. Division of the agenda into differentiable bites, to be debated separately and disjointed from each other, would -REDACTED-.

### **Recommendations**

Therefore, we recommend the following proposal to not only be considered but welcomed in the preparation and establishment of the committee for its success and delivering the best experience to its delegates:

#### **Committee Structure**

To be compatible with the chosen unicameral structure, the US side of the crisis shall be emulated. This will be done by a recreation of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM), created specifically to advise President Kennedy on the Cuban Missile Crisis, with slight modifications to its real-life counterpart:

#### **Composition of EXCOMM in BAALMUN<sup>2</sup>**

- **John F Kennedy, President (Delegate)<sup>3</sup>**
- **Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President (Delegate)**

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<sup>1</sup> Record of Chair -REDACTED AS HEA-

<sup>2</sup> Positions of the dias is TBD.

<sup>3</sup> Members in bold text represent full members (e.g. can vote), other members are only advisors to the EXCOMM.

- **Dean Rusk, Secretary of State (Delegate)**
- **Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense (Delegate)**
- **Robert F Kennedy, Attorney General (Delegate)**
- **McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor (Delegate)**
- **John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence (Delegate)**
- **Gen Maxwell D Taylor (Army), Chairman of the JCS (Delegate)**
- **Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador to the USSR (Delegate)**
- **Adlai Stevenson, Ambassador to the UN (Delegate)**

10 Delegates (one in observer status).

### Rules of Procedure

We recommend a modified rules of procedure compiled following the [definition of the Model United Nations of the University of Chicago](#). Such modifications should include a more realistic approach to simulate the EXCOMM as:

#### **Flow of Debate**

To accommodate more debating time, the moderated and unmoderated caucuses the MUNUC suggest shall be changed to a continuous semi-moderated caucus, with the ability for members to propose motions directly on the floor. The dias may allow for unmoderated caucuses (hence referred to as “executive pauses” to sort and run through administrative matters the agenda may arise (e.g. consolidation and voting of directives).

#### **Directives**

Directives shall only express the common will of the EXCOMM, no delegate can publish individual directives to directly alter the course of events (UPDATE 2.0: UNLESS I WITNESS WONDERS, MR. PRESIDENT), or -REDACTED- (UPDATE 2.0 ENABLES TOP SECRET DIRECTIVES NOW). Individual directives for acquiring information and low-influence orders from a department where the delegate is its superior shall be allowed. A third of the committee must sign

committee directives (aka National Security Memorandums) before they can be voted. A motion which passes without a veto from the President is adopted.

### Programme of Work and Notes

Time is of the essence in our simulation. Our work shall start early to compensate for any latency we might experience during -REDACTED-.

For the execution of the agenda, we recommend dividing the crisis into three days as how it unfolded that way: The first day involved -REDACTED-; the second day will be the shipment of nuclear missiles into -REDACTED-; and, allot the last day to the final tense moments of the crisis with the finale being the -REDACTED- (WAIT FOR IT) end.

Our recommendation is to simulate what the -REDACTED- Missile -REDACTED- truly means.

Further, consider neutralising the committee by apocalyptic nuclear warfare if they drain or disregard diplomatic options for a resolution. (UPDATE 2.0: THE GREAT TRIAL AWAITS)

The committee shall be always kept on edge by suspicious intelligence reports, conflicting and confusing responses from the -REDACTED-, severed and poor communication between the US and the -REDACTED-, and endless incidents of miscommunication that constantly remind the delegates of their impending annihilation.

### **Note: People of the US**

Let us also bring up the issue of what democracy brings: people. -REDACTED- happened after President Kennedy had drawn a red line that no Soviet missiles would be in Cuba. This crisis forces him to take decisive action before the US population as the midterm elections for Congress approach. Not only do the delegates have to work to mediate the Soviets, but they will also have to keep the public mood acceptable for the elections.

**Note: Cuba and Fidel Castro**

-REDACTED- (UPDATE 2.0: SHORT GUY WITH A DISRUPTIVE TEMPER, BE CAREFUL WHEN IT COMES TO HIM.)

**Note: DEFCON**

The [Defense Readiness Condition \(DEFCON\)](#) is a confidential alert state the US Armed Forces uses to indicate how quickly the forces can mobilise, primarily for nuclear warfare. Its five-staged system could also indicate how close the US could be to nuclear warfare. For immersion and enjoyment purposes, we recommend its inclusion.

(DEFCON is to be determined mutually by the JCS, Secretary of Defense, and the President.)

**Note: International Order and the UN**

The world still revolves as this crisis unfolds. Especially for the Shining Beacon of Democracy, support from international channels was another vital aspect of the crisis, proving the situation worsened to a much deeper point that never happened historically. Nevertheless, the UN was also involved in the matter, both about -REDACTED- and the -REDACTED-.